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OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE SUPREME COURT
CONSOLIDATED FINANCE
CORPORATION,

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

vs.

KENT MOULTON, dba SOUTH
DA \'IS CAMPER SALES, and

Case
No.
12266

INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation,
~HD-CENTURY

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATElVIENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sought in the Trial Court judgment
against a bonding company and a used camper salesman for the sale price of a used trailer which the
~alesman sold. The salesman collected and converted
the sales price. Plaintiff's claim is based on Section
H-3-16, U.C.A., which requires the bonding company
to guarantee that the dealer will conduct his business
without fraud.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following the trial of this matter, Trial Court
granted a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice and upon the merits, and denied plaintiff
any relief vvhatsoever.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Trial Court's judgment and an order entering judgment in its favor and
against defendants for the balance owing fr.om the
sale price of the trailer, an agreed figure of $2,206.60,
plus costs and attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this matter are simple and to a large
extent undisputed.
Plaintiff's claim is based on the requirements of
Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, which requires
a dealer in campers to provide a bond conditioned
upon him conducting his business as a dealer without
fraud or fraudulent representation. Kent Moulton,
dba South Davis Camper Sales, was such a dealer, and
Mid-Century Insurance Company furnished the bond
guaranteeing his freedom from fraud and fraudulent
representation.
Early in 196 7 plaintiff repossessed a trailer in
Pioche, Nevada and arranged with Moulton to pick
the trailer up and bring it to his trailer sales locati.on
in Davis County. Moulton picked up the trailer and
2
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brought it to his yard. Title to the trailer was kept
by plaintiff during the period that it was in the yard
(R. 4~2). In May of 1967 Moulton advised plaintiff's
agent Allen that he had a sale for the trailer and
needed the title to deliver to the buyer of the trailer
( R. 42). Plaintiff delivered the title and received a
check, Exhibit P-2, in payment for the net of the sale
price of the trailer CR. 42). The check was deposited
in the bank but dishonored for insufficient funds.
Plaintiff's agent checked with the bank on which
the Exhibit P-2 was drawn and was advised that it
was not good. The check was held for several days to
get information as to its collectibility and finally put
in to plaintiff's bank for collection CR. 64). Collecti.on efforts were continued and Moulton finally personally contacted plaintiff's manager, Allen, and
said, "Well, there had been a mix-up at the bank,"
and "rather than send it back, I will give you another
one and you take and run it through and it will be
all right." ( R. 65). Plaintiff then received a second
check for $4, 700.00, which is Exhibit P-6. This check
was made directly to Consolidated's agent, Clyde
Allen, but was actually the plaintiff's money (R. 65).
Plaintiff continued to make efforts to collect and
finally, through a number .of small payments, collected $2,493AO, leaving a balance owing to plaintiff
of $2,206.60 (R. 68).
Plaintiff's witness Allen testified that there was
no arrangement for credit to Moulton for the purehase price of the trailer ( R. 42-43). Moulton did
not testify to any arrangement for extension of credit.

3
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There is no question that plaintiff placed the
trailer with the dealer for sale. The dealer agreed
to sell it and pay the net received to the owner CR. 7475). The title was surrendered upon the representation by defendant Moulton that he had sold the ,
trailer and needed title to complete the transaction
CR. 75). There was no evidence of any agreement on
the part of plaintiff to extend credit to Moulton for
the ainount due from the sale of the trailer (R. 76).
Moulton converted the money to his own
account. There never was sufficient money in his
account to pay plaintiff. Moulton had no arrange·
ments with the bank to honor the check. Although
the bank did have arrangements with defendant
Moulton to finance or floor the purchase by him of
new trailers, they had no agreement to finance or
floor the purchase of this used trailer CR. 49-50-51).
Moulton testified that he had a man pick up
the trailer CR. 79). He had it in his yard for two or
three months. Obtained the title and warranty papers
on it before he had a sale for it CR. 80) . Originally the
trailer was offered for $5,500.00, but the price reduced
when no offers were received to $5,000.00. The
$4,700.00 check for the net on the trailer sales was
picked up in Bountiful CR. 80). Moulton testified he
advised Allen that the check wasn't good at the timr
he delivered it to him, but that the check was delivered on the date it bears, May 26th CR. 81). He
also testified that when the second check was de·
livered he advised Allen that it was not good CR. 81) ·
'
After both
checks had bounced, Moulton discussed
4
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with Allen putting the balance on a contract and
letting it be paid monthly, but this was not done and
'.\1oulton went broke and didn't pay any more than
the amounts collected CR. 81).
Moulton collected the $5,000.00 sale price in
March, 1967, he testified CR. 82). He did not give
Allen, Consolidated's agent, a check until May.
Moulton ran the money from the sale price of the
trailer through his South Davis account and does not
recall whether he advised Allen about the sale and
the receipt of the $5,000.00 when the transaction
occurred CR. 82). Allen, the agent for Consolidated
who handled the transaction with defendant Moulton, testified that he had no recollection or reference
that Moulton ever advised him that the checks when
rlelivered were not good, and that it was only a few
days after he had delivered title that the check was
received in the mail CR. 86-87). Moulton testified
also that at the time the figure on the trailer was
arrived at, he intended to pay Allen for the trailer
(R. 87).
There is no evidence of an agreement between
plaintiff and Moulton to sell the trailer to Moulton.
The court, in its memorandum decision and findings,
found that the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant Moulton was one of seller and purchaser
(R. 30). Court places great emphasis on the fact that
after Moulton had delivered the two insufficient
funds checks, his attempts to pay off the checks before
he went broke shows an intention not to defraud
1 R. 30).

5
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In the court's Finding No. 3, CH. 91), the
court finds that Moulton sold the trailer on or about
the 26th of May, 1967 for the sum .of $5,000.00. There
is no evidence \Yhatsoever that this \Vas the date when
it was sold. This finding contradicts Moulton's own
evidence ( R. 82).
Conclusion No. 1, that tlw relationship was that
of seller and purchaser, is without support of any
evidence and contrary to the testimony .of both parties
to the transaction. Even if the court is correct that
the relationship was seller and purchaser, the giving
of the insufficient funds check was a fraudulent payment by purchaser of the pure hase price.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MOULTON, AS A MATTER OF LAW, CONDUCTED HIS BUSINESS AS A DEALER
FRAUDULENTLY.
Plaintiff submits that the Trial Court completely
misconceived the law applicable to the operations of
automobile dealer and failed to apply the provisions
of Section 41-3-16, Utah Code Annoted, as intended
by the legislature of the State of Utah.
The evidence in several areas shows fraudulent
conduct on the part of Moulton. The evidence is
undisputed, uncontradicted, and clear and convincing.

6
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( a J Moulton s.old the trailer and collected

$~,000.00 on the sale price in March, 1967

without advising the plaintiff of the sale or
collection ( R. 82 J.

It is undisputed, since it is the testimony of
Moulton himself, that he collected the proceeds
fr.om the sale two months before he told the
plaintiff about the sale. There is no question
about this matter since it is Moulton's own
testimony on cross-examination. There is no
question a bout the date of the check for
$4,700.00 since it bears the date of May 26th
and was delivered within a few days of the
elate it bears CR. 42).
Since this is defendant Moulton's own testimony and the check is a document clear on
its face, it is submitted by plaintiff that this is
clear and convincing evidence, undisputed, and
must be considered as the basis for a finding as
a matter of law that Moulton engaged in a
fraudulent transaction.
( b) Moulton delivered a check on May 26th
or shortly thereafter bearing date of May 26th
at a time when he did not have money available in the bank to pay the check. There is no
question the check was not postdated. Moulton
claims that he advised Allen, agent of plaintiff,
that the check was not good, but Allen denies
that any representation of this kind was made.
As a matter of fact, the check was delivered
through the mail, according to Allen, and no
conversation occurred at which there could be
a contradiction of the face of the check itself
which shows no evidence of postdating.
(c) Under (a) and (b), by the defendant
lVIoulton's own admissions, he was guilty of the
7
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crime of e1nbezzlement as defined in 76-17-5.
Utah Code Annotated, which defines said act
''e~ery person entrusted with any property as
bailee, tenant or lodger, or with any power of
attorney for the sale or transfer thereof, whD
fraudulently converts the same, or the proceed~
thereof, to his own use, or secretes it with a
fraudulent intent to convert it to his own use.
is guilty of embezzlement."

as

It is undisputed, uncontradicted and admitted
by Moulton under .oath that, without Consolidated's
knowledge, he sold Consolidated's trailer, received
$5,000.00, put it in his bank account, and two months
later gave a bum check for the proceeds of the sale.
In doing these acts, he engaged in a series of fraudulent acts and conducted his dealer's business in a
fraudulent manner, converting plaintiff's property.
which subjected the bonding company to liability £01
the loss caused to plaintiff. The evidence is clear, co11v1ncmg, and uncontra<licted of this frauduknt
conduct.
It becon1es even more obvious that there was a11
intention to defraud when one takes into consideration the fact that Moulton never did make the chf'ck
good. He converted plaintiff's funds to other purposes.
There was no effort on his part to postdate or get an
agreement for an extension of credit for the pure hasr
price of the trailer. Section 76-20-11, Utah Code
Annotated, makes the drawing of insufficient funds
checks a crime and provides:
8
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.. The making, drawing, uttering, or delivering
of such check, draft, or order as aforesaid shall
be prima facie evidence of intent to defraud."

( cU The giving of the check dated June 26th
Exhibit P-6, again was the violation of th~
criminal code because once more the check
was not paid and was drawn against insufficient funds. The same argument in (a) and
Cb) would be true of this check since it obtained an extension of credit, permitting him
to use plaintiff's money for additional time.
The only alleviating circumstance that is present
to contradict the clear, convincing evidence that
Woulton intended to defraud Consolidated is that
after he had converted the vehicle and used the proceeds from its sale in his business, he attempted to
pay back the $4,700.00 which he had obtained fraudulently. Was there ever a converter who acted otherwis<:> when caught in the act?
The record is replete with other evidence of
vvrongdoing by Moulton in the manner in which he
appropriated the proceeds from the sale of plaintiff's
trailer. One could not argue fairly that the evidence
is not clear and convincing. The four points made
in la), (b), (c) and Cd) are cases where there is no
contradiction in the evidence as to what happened.
The case closest on the facts and law which
plc=iintiff has been able to find in its research is Comml"rcial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey
'" Watson, 261 F. 2d 143, (Tenth Cir.). This case
came out of New Mexico to the Tenth Circuit and the
9
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language of the licensing statute contained the
language that is in the Utah Code. Judge Murrah
discussed several cases. The circumstances under
which the claim against the bonding company arose
in the Commercial Insurance case are so similar to
this case that a recitation of Murrah's opinion on the
point may be helpful:
"Import was a wholesale dealer in foreign
automobiles. Powell represented to Import's
Manager that he had a sale for a Volkswagen
and induced Import to give him possession of
it and to deposit the title papers in the Los
Alamos branch of a Santa Fe Bank with a sight
draft for the purchase price in the sum of
$1,625. The title papers so deposited consisted
of an assignment from the original nonresident
owner by power of attorney to Import's Manager, and a "reassignment .of title by registered
dealer" from Import to Powell's Downtown
Auto Sales at Santa Fe. When the sight draft
was not paid, Powell instructed Import to draw
another draft for the amount of the purchase
price, with title attached, on another bank
where he usually did business, and through
which he would "floor-plan" the car. Import
finally instructed the bank to release title to
Powell without payment of the draft, but to return the attached power of attorney. In a subsequent telephone conversation, Import complained of nonreceipt of payment and Powell
professed not to understand why payment had
not been made by the bank, and said that he
would go to the bank and see what was up.
Several days later, Powell sold the automobile
and delivered the certificate of title and a bill
of sale. Powell died shortly thereafter without
having ever paid Import for the purchase price
10
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of the automobile. When the purchaser of the
automobile from Powell was unable to secure
transfer of title because of the absence of the
power of attorney from the original owner
Import then delivered the power of attorney~
clear the title and took an assignment of the
purchaser's claim against Powell."
"The appellant also challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence to prove fraudulent conduct by
the requisite clear and convincing evidence,
especially since the person to whom the fraud
is attributable is dead. And see Pacific Royalty
Co. v. Williams, 1 Cir., 227 F. 2d 49, 55. But
we think Powell's actions in obtaining possession of the automobile and then title for the
ostensible purpose of "floor-planning" the car
at a bank, when considered in the light of his
later professions not to know why payment had
not been made by the bank, though he had not
negotiated the agreed financing, certainly
indicate an intent to defraud his seller. Indeed,
it was quite sufficient to justify the court's
finding of fraudulent conduct."
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT MISCONCEIVED THE
NATURE OF THE FRAUD REQUIRED TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff's claim against defendant Moulton and
defendant's bonding company, Mid-Century Insurance Company, is based on a regulatory statute of
the State of Utah, Section 41-3-16. As far as applicable to the cause of action, said statute reads as
follows:
11
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Mot~r .dealers ''shall procure and file with the
admm1strator a good and sufficient bond in the
amount of $5_,000.00 with corporate surety
thereon, duly licensed to do business within the
state of Utah, approved as to form by the attorney general of the state of Utah, and conditioned that said applicant shall conduct his
business as a dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation, and without the violation
of any pr.ovision of this act."

There was clearly a violation of the section by
Moulton in the transaction with plaintiff. His conduct may actually have been criminal. He might
have been convicted of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses. However, that is n.ot what
plaintiff must show in order to recover against the
bonding company.
The regulatory statutes envision a higher level
of honesty and fair dealing with the public generally
than where criminal conduct is the concern. This
fraud is of the nature of the fraud that is a tort.
Fraud as used in the regulatory statute is the
kind of fraud that is defined by Corpus Juris Secun·
dum and cited in the case .of Vogelsang u. Wolpert,
38 Cal. Rptr. 440, 227 C.A. 2d 102, page 445, where
the California court was concerned with the fraudu·
lent obtaining of property without adequate consideration. The court there stated, page 445:
''Wilful fraud, to borrow a figure from ~lassical
antiquity, is a hydra-headed monster; its faces
are various; they may differ one from another
as markedly as personal and business relation12
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ships are unlike in the modern world but all
of them have this in common that wilf~l fraud
is alw~ys instin~t with guile. By false representations, knowmgly made, the beneficiary of
actual fraud has wilfully induced another to
part with his property without adequate compensation; he has been guilty of overreaching,
of dishonest gain by misleading another of
obtaining property under circumstances which
are unfair and unconscionable and which thr
law will not tolerate.
In 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 1, pages 204-205, it is said:
"Fraud is a generic term which embraces all
the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to gain an advantage over another by
false suggestions or by suppression of the truth.
In its general or generic sense, it comprises all
acts, omissions, and concealments involving a
breach of legal or equitable duty and resulting
in damage to another, or the taking of unduf'
or unconscientious advantage of another; * * *
"Fraud has also been defined as any cunning~
deception, or artifice used to circumvent, cheat.
or deceive another."
The kind of fraud that plaintiff submits is
intended in the bonding provision is also discussed in
additional California case, Wayne z·. Bureau of
Private Investigators and Adjusters, Department of
Professional and Vocational Standards, 20 Cal. Rptr.
194, 201 C.A. 2d 427. This was a proceeding to
review an order of suspension of a private investigator
13
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and adjuster's license. The basis on which the license
was suspended was an accusation that the investigator
and adjuster engaged in "fraud and dishonesty in
failing to disclose that he was acting in behalf of an
adverse party." The court in discussing the law
applicable, stated as follows:
"(2) Fraud embraces multifarious means
whereby one person gains an advantage over
another and means in effect bad faith, dishonesty or overreaching.
"There is no doubt that a false impression
may consist in a concealment of what is true
as well as the assertion of what is false. (See
Commonwealth v. Smith, 242 Ky. 365, 46 S. W.
2d 474, 477.) The causing or the bringing
about of false impressions under the circumstances constitutes fraud. The petitioner here
in effect admits that had he refused to give any
ansvvers to the questions put to him by the
interviewees with reference to whom he represented that undoubtedly he would have had to
return to his office with no statements. He
elected to suppress or intentionally withhold
information from the interviewees which, had
it been given, would have resulted in the interviewees' being fully informed. His motive was
obvious. It was said in Commonwealth v.
Smith, supra, at 478:
"Fraud vitiates whatever it touches. 'It is
a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can
devise and are resorted to by one individual to
get an advantage .over anot?er. No definite
and invariable rule can be laid down as a gen·
eral proposition defining fraud, as it includes
all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and
14
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unfair ways by which another is cheated.'
(Citations) 'Actual fraud' may be discovered
as f.ollows,. 'when the party intentionally, or by
design, misrepresents a material fact, or produces a false impression in order to mislead
another, or to entrap .or cheat him, or to obtain
an undue advantage of him; in every such case
there is positive fraud, in the truest sense of the
terms.' (Citations) 'The principal difference
between 'actual' and 'constructive' fraud is
that in the first case there is an intent to induce
another to part with property or surrender
some legal right, while in the other, although
the act may accomplish that purpose, there is
no such intent .on the part of the actor.' "
This court has on several occasions had before
it the problem of interpreting the bonding law. The
first case was Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239
P. 2d 749. In this case the court held that the protection of the statute applied to a person financing automobile transactions and defrauded when the automobile dealer converted the proceeds of a loan to his
own personal use. In the Bates v. Simpson case, it
was agreed on the appeal that judgment against the
bonding company in favor of the customer was proper
(page 170).
In the case .of Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257,
300 P. 2d 619, this court had before it the question of
whether or not fraud existed which would make the
bond available to a mortgagee. The fraudulent representation by the used car dealer was to a bank employee that the used car dealer was the owner of the
automombile, when in fact he was not, and did not
15
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have title. The bank <lid not require the dealer to
exhibit the title to the automobile or deliver it, and
the bonding company claimed that this was negligence on the bank's part which would bar its recovery
from the bonding cmnpany for the fraud of the
dealer. This court, in ruling in favor of the bank,
made the following holding (Ward is the used car
dealer):
''Ward, knowing of the method used by the
bank in financing his sales, deliberately contrived to deceive its agent. This was no mere
promise or opinion; he stated that he owned
the automobile, knowing that the agent would
believe him and act upon his representation.
Clearly this was fraud and the bank should
have judgment against the bonding company
for this amount.
" ( 5) 2. One Dalton purchased a 1954 Chevolet from United Auto Sales and executed his
note to the Sandy City Bank. A check, payable
to Dalton and United Auto Sales jointly, was
sent to the company by the bank and later
cashed and collected. When the company was
unable to deliver title, Dalton refused to pay on
the note because his endorsement .on the check
was a forgery. The trial court gave judgment
for the bank against Ward and Selleneit since
they had received the proceeds of the check.
A forgery likewise falls within the protection of
the bond and it is immaterial that the bank
carried insurance a gain st forgery."
In the Lawrence LJ. Ward decision, court discussed the Arizona case of Commercial Standard Insurance Co. l'. lVest, 74 Ariz. 359, 249, P. 2d 430. The
Hi
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Arizona case expanded the coverage to include the
people doing other things with the used car dealer
than buying a car off his lot. The most significant
aspect of the Commercial Standard case however is
'
'
the holding that a mere conversion of monies
is fraud
within the meaning of the statute and is an act
covered by the bond. This is the situation in our
present case as Moulton converted Consolidated's
money and applied it to his own use. In describing
the kind of act which is covered by the bond, the
Arizona Supreme Court stated that:
" ( 3, 4) The instant statute and bond are not
limited but are all-inclusive where there has
been an unlawful act by the dealer, for the
statute expressly provided that "Such bond
shall inure to the benefit of any person who
shall suffer any loss by reason of any unlawful
act of the licensee." CEmp. sup.) The Supreme
Court of Louisiana, in the case of Hartman v.
Greene, 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390, 391, stated:
"The term 'an unlawful act' does not mean
necessarily a criminal act; it means a
wrongful act, or a tort-any wrongful act
(not involving a breach of contract) for
which a civil action will lie. * * *"
Applying this rule to the facts of this case, we
hold that the surety (appellant) is liable to
appellee for the conversion by defendant Reid
of moneys belonging to appellee, as the acts
complained of arose out of Reid's actions in the
capacity of a used car dealer. Had the latter
not been a licensed dealer he would have been
unable to follow the procedure outlined to procure for himself the commission out of the re-
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serve fund which was set up at the bank for
such dealers. We perceive no legal distinction
between the admitted right of the bank to
recover on the bond had it suffered a loss and
the right of the appellee to do likewise."
Another interesting case arriving at the conclusion advocated by plaintiff is State ex rel MacNaughton v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 1 Wis. 2d
494, 85 N.W. 2d 337. In this case the customer of the
used car lot had left his automobile to be sold, and
without his knowledge or consent, the used car
dealer mortgaged the car to a finance company and
subsequently sold the car after the bond covering his
operation had expired. The bonding company defended on the ground that the innocent owner of the
automobile did not sustain a loss until the sale and
that the mortgaging of his car did not damage him.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the following
language, required the bonding company to pay the
loss to MacNaughton:
" ( 1, 2) DeWitt's act of mortgaging the MacNaughton Pontiac on October 5, 1953, constituted a fraudulent conversion, - grounds for
suspension or revocation of his license under
the statute. That act took place within the
bond period. Appellant contends that MacN aughton suffered no actual loss, however,
until the car was sold the following April. We
cannot agree. MacNaughton's loss was actual
when the car was mortgaged, whether he knew
it or not. Appellant argues that the mortgaging caused no more loss to Mac~ a ugh ton t~an
if DeWitt had taken $10 out of h1s pocket w1thout his knowing it, used it for two weeks and
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then put the money back without his knowledge. The analogy fails because by his act
DeWitt placed himself in a position where he
could not "put it back," and where he could
not perform his contract with MacNaughton.
After the date of the mortgage MacNaughton's
interest was subject to the mortgage; he could
not have prevailed against the mortgage interest of an innocent party."
This court, in a number of cases not dealing
directly with automobile dealers or the type of
transaction between plaintiff and Moulton, has discussed principles which are believed to be applicable.
In the case of Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384
P. 2d 802, the court stated at page 382.
"So we conclude that here there was a suppression of the truth, which the party with superior
knowledge had a duty to disclose, which
amounted to fraud.
"One of the fundamental tenets of the
Anglo-American law of fraud is that fraud may
be committed by the suppression of the
truth * * * as well as the suggestion of falsehood * * * *."
"Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud,
must relate to a material matter known to the
party and which it is his legal du_ty to communicate to the other contracting party,
whether the duty arises from a relation of
trust from confidence inequality of condition
'
.
and ' knowledge, or other
attendant circumstances * * * * ."
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"The principle is basic in the law of fraud
as it relates to nondisclosure that a charge of
fraud is maintainable where a party who
knows nrnterial facts is under a duty, under the
circumstances, to speak and disclose his information, but remains silent * * *."
The Elder case involved a buyer-seller relationship, and surely the relationship was equally confidential here where Moulton was entrusted with valuable property to be sold.
The court also has enlightening language in
some of the criminal cases. One of the most recent
ones points out that the giving of an insufficient funds
check where there has been no arrangements for
credit or no funds available to pay the check, is strong
evidence, in accordance with the statutory language,
of intent to defraud. Moulton never did have money
available to make the checks good that he gave to
Consolidated and repeatedly represented to Consolidated a false state of facts that there was some foul-up
on the bank's part when he knew there was not. The
case referred to is Utah u. Coleman, 17 Utah 2d 166,
+06 P. 2d 308, in which the court unanimously held,
in an opinion by Justice Crockett, as follows:
"It is not to be doubted that the making and
delivering of a check when the maker does not
have sufficient funds or credit with the bank
to cover it, in the absence of any other proof,
is sufficient proof to make a prima facie case
of intent to defraud as Sec. 76-20-11 provides.
However, any other evidence b~aring upon the
accused's intent must be considered. For ex20
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ample, even if he did not have sufficient money
or credit in the bank at the instant the check
was made and delivered, if the proof showed
that he had arranged to have money or credit
in the bank by the time the check is presented
for payment, that would negate any intent to
defraud; and the evidence need raise only a
reasonable doubt as to his having such intent
in order to preclude his conviction."
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence is
clear and convincing that Moulton engaged in fraudulent conduct and that his bond should be available
to the plaintiff to pay the loss suffered as a result
of said fraudulent activity.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that this court should
reverse the Trial Court and order judgment entered
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for
the amount of loss sustained by plaintiff, together
with a reasonable attorney's fee for the plaintiff's
attorney.
Dated this ........ day of ................................ , 1970.
DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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